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As the wodd becomes more globalized, the lines dividing countries and
cultures are increasingly blurred. Thc inter-connectedness of the globe brings
people thousands of miles away together in a matter of seconds. However, as
globahzation has increased, other theories of dividing the world have arisen.
One of the most prominent theories of dividing up the wodd was published
rn 1,993 in F-oreign Affairs by Samuel Fluntington. Huntington attempted to
provide readers with a new term that described a long-standing, tnternahzed
political myth: "The idea of a Clash between Civthzattons is a sort of
electric spark that sets people's imagination alight, because it finds fertile
soil in which to proliferate" (Bottici & Challand, 2010, p. 2). The populariry
of this theory can p^rtly be attributed to its timing. The Soviet Union had
collapsed just two years before, and the public, as well as policy makers,
were having a difficult time making sense of the new unipolarf multipolar
wodd. Huntington provided a frame to help make sense of this world. His
book had a large influence on those in political power and the general public,
providing a very particular lens for \Testern society to look through. I argue,
similady to Phrlip Seib,l that, in varying degrees, the U.S. media collectively
adopted a framework of the Clash of Civilizatlons in its representation
of Muslims and Islam, which in turn supported the aggressive military
endeavors in Afghanistan and Iraq.
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The idea of the Clash of Civrlizatlons has been held within many
different societies in history. To this day there is argument regarding the
genesis of the idea of the Clash of Civilizations. TtLis issue, however,
is irrelevant to my research. I will briefly review the literature of the
European colonization of Eastern countries, for this is the time period
when the concept of Orientalism came to fruition. In postcolonial studies
the main purpose of Orientalism is "colonial discourse." Doris Garcaway
gives a summary of the concept:
In the work of Edward Said, Gayatri Spivak, and Homi Rhabha,
'colonial discourse'has been described as the epistemological corollary
to colonial violence, a system of knowledge and representation through
which Europeans produced, defined, and contained non-European
difference and, in the process developed ideological justifications of
colonialism. (Gar raway ; 209)
The non-European was, in other words, shaped by European
intellectual discourses in
that supported European colonial
^way
of power is
endeavors. Garraway continues, "This discursive
^pplra;tus
said to have relied in many instances on a structure of binary opposition
that posited the racial, cultural, and linguistic inferiority of the colonized as
compared with the Europeans" (Garraway 209). The Clash of Civilizations
theory imitates this concept in a more agile fashion than in colonial times.
There is a dialectical relationship between the STest and Islam which is
implied by Huntington throughout his book. trady on he even addresses
this dialectic: 'IWe know who we are only when we know who u/e are not
and often only when we know whom we are against" (Hunungton,2003,
p. 21).The negative creates the positive, and vice vers a. To say the West is
democratic, liberal, and free, then placing the Islamic wodd opposite the
West, implies the Islamic world is non-democratic and backward.2 From
here, as mentioned above by Garraway, the campaign calls for involvement

in the Islamic wodd however the West sees fit. The West is seen as the
pinnacle of civilization, and so must help the other civilizations modernrze.
The concept of the !7est as the apex of the wodd is central in Clash of
Civilizations and the Remaking of Wodd Order and Huntington's view of
the wodd can partly be attributed to Francis Fukuy^mab E,nd of History
thesis. Huntington built Clash of Civilizations using the model established
by Fukuya;ma.In order to fully understand the ideology of the \West as the
best it is necess ary to examine the main argument of The End of History
before beginning my analysis of Huntington's work.
34
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In his book The End of History and the Last Man, Fukuyama

summarizes his thesis: "I argued that liberal democracy may constitute
the 'end point of mankind's ideological evolution' and the 'final form
of human government,' and such constituted the 'end of history"
(Fukuyama,1.989, p. 1). This is a variation from the Marxist historical
interpretation of global economic systems evenrually culminating in the
creation of a woddwide communist society. Fukuyama's linear impression
of governmental bodies posits all other current and former governmental
bodies behind the ideal of liberal democracy. He writes: 'flWhile some
present-day countries might fail to achieve stable libetal democracy, and
others might lapse back into other, more primitive forms of rule like
theocracy or military dtctatorship, the ideal of libetal democracy could not
be improved on" (Fukuyama,1,989, p.1). It is from this Fluntington builds
his Clash of Civilizations theory. If one sees the wotld as divided between
the \West and everyone else (Huntington 1,996, p. 22) the immediate
thought is the West holding power over the rest. Again the dialectical
relationship emerges with Fukuyamat claim: Liberal democracy is the end,
the best, and so it becomes the thesis and other governmeflts become the
antithesis. In this case, the \West can either remain uninvolved in the other
governments, allowing them to cventually become liberal democracies
like the \West or, supported by Fukuyama's comment about governments
"[apsing] back into other, more prirnitive forms of rule," the STest could
take aggressive action in an effort to contain the threat or possibl), for."
the government into a democracy. It is from this point I will begin my
analysis of Fluntington's argument for the Clash of Civilizztlons.
Huntington's book is divided into five parts, which are centered
on the idea "culture and cultural identities. . . are shaping the patterfls
of cohesion, disintegration, and conflict in the post-Cold \War world"
(Huntington, 1996,p.20). These fve parts ate: 1) An assessment of a
multipolar and multicivilizatTon lwodd; 2) The shifting balance of power
among civilizations; 3) 'A Civilizatlon-based wodd order is emerging;"
4) "The $7est's universalist pretensions increasingly bring it into conflict
with other civilizations, most seriously with Islam and China;" 5) "The
survival of the West depends on Americans reaffrrmtng their STestern
identity and Westerners accepting their civilization as unique not universal
and uniting to renew and preserve it against challenges from non-Xfestern
societies" (Huntington, 1996,20-1). In my research, close attention will
be paid to Parts 4 and 5, for they are extremely volatile assertions when
incorporated into the political realm, specifically foreign policy. I will come
,-,

,--4

1*2
z

t

-9

Z^

i,"e7-7'_y4.,

i **,n

o-,_,

''a

4;,zi rzvuTs r::.;i i { )"

frz
?

r;:'12;s.

back to this issue lzter ofl iri this paper, as it is very important to the core
argument in my research. Subsequent to Huntington's mentioning the five
parts of his argument, he establishes his nine civilizations of the world.
The civilizations are listed as: "S7estern, Lattn American, African, Islamic,
Sinic, Hindu, Orthodox, Buddhist, and Japanese" (Huntington, 1996, p.
27). Huntington pays close attention to, as mentioned in part 4,Islam and
Confucian civt\zations. The attention paid to Islam in particular takes up
an Orientalist position. The concept of "knowing" the Orient is displayed
in Huntington's assessment of Islam. It is the classic example of the \fest
interpreting the East Lrraway that supports the $7est's endeavors.3
In evaluating different civilizations' viability for democracy in the
eaily stages of his argument, Huntington pays close attention to Islam.
At one point he writes, "Islamic culture explains in large part the failure
of demo cracy to emerge in much of the Muslim wodd" a point he fails
to elaborate upon (Huntington 1996;29). Huntington makes a sweeping
generahzation of the Orient without any support and then, unexpectedly,
goes on to praise Edward Said's work, Orientalism. Regardirg Saidt work

Huntingtofl

says,

These myths [U"ity of the non-S7est, as well as the East-\il7est
dichotomy] suffer the defects of the Orientalism which Edward Said
appropriately criticized for promoting 'the difference berween the
famitar (Europe, the \West, 'm') and the strange (the Orient, the East,
'them') and for assuming the inherent superiority of the former to the
latter (Huntington, 1996, p. 33)

As mentioned above, the generaTtzatton of Islamic culture attests to
the idea of Orientalism, yet Huntington explicidy denounces the idea while
implicidy supporting it.
In Clash of Civilizations, Huntington attempts to change the popular
conception of the East-West dichotomy which ends up just adding to the
problem. He argues,
Instead of 'East and !7est,'it is more appropriate to speak of 'the \il7est
and the rest,'which at least implies the existence of many non-Wests.
The world is too complex to be usefully envisioned for most purposes
as simply divided economically benveen North and South or culturally
between East and !7est (Huntington, 1,996, p. 33).

The first and most glaring issue with this passage is the ethnocentrism
"the \West and the rest" implies. This phrase places the importance
on the West while lumping every other country in the wodd together.
Huntington, with this phrase, practices an Orientalist tactic of using the
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crvlTzatlon. He is able to guard against any potential
accusations of being called an Orientalist by referencing Edward Said
eadier on in the book. Huntington's use of denying what he textually
follows through r,vith I will call explicit-denunciation-implicit-support.
Huntington makes two more points which should be mentioned before
concluding this analysis of his argument. The first is: "Islam and China
embody great cultural traditions very different from and in their eyes
infinitely superior to that of the.West" (Huntington, 2003, p.185).
Huntington's statement here displays, once agatn, his Orientalist stance
of knowing the Orient and how they perceive the wodd; in particular,
how they perceive the west. The distinction of Islam and China against
the \West helps to construct a new enemy of the United States. Flowever,
Huntington's argument focuses on Islam, using China almost as a guatdirg
term against criticism. Following this passage, Huntington presents his
three issues within Islamic and Confucian societies the \West must become
more involved in:
$7est as a pinnacle

(1) to maintain its military superiority through policies

of

nonproliferation and counterproliferation with respect to nuclear,
biological, and chemical weapons and the means to deliver them; (2)
to promote'Western poJitical values and institutions by pressing other
societies to respect human rights as conceived in the \West and adopt
democracy on STestern lines; and (3) to protect the cultural, social, and
ethnic integrity of Western societies by restricting the number of nonSfesterners admitted as immigrants or refugees. (Huntington, 1996,
185-6)4

The first clause in this section calls for the efforts of US policy makers
to maintain a unipolar miJitary dominance of the wodd. This is important
because people in the US at this time were having difficulty figuring out
what the wodd would look like subsequent to the falI of the Soviet Union.
Reginning around the time this book was written, up until today, the US
has focused heavily on the nuclear, chemical, and biological proliferation
in countries, particulady in the Islamic wodd-i.e. Syria, IraQ, and Iran.
The second clause, which initially may seem altruistic and humanttart^n,
when used by radtcal policy makers can cal). for a Machiavellian-type of
promotion of lfestetn values. It also impJies a certatn ethnocentrism,
which denounces all other civilizations'values and institutions-this idea
refers back to Fukuyama's End of History. A particular instance this clause
is adopted and carried out in the Bush administration's use of the figure of
the Afghan woman-depicted as marginalized, oppressed, and weak under
the rule of the Taliban-in an effort to garrler support for the Afghanistan
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war. The third clause, though

itr,"'_r ir:ii"4',Tt 'ii'z t.s.?t.

it focuses on immigrants and refugees,

alludes to the ideal American who fits a particular cultural, social, and
ethnic frame. This allusion moves those who are Amertcan citizens who do
not fit the ideal model to the periphery of society.
Huntington's Clash of Civilizatlons theory provided policy makers and
laypeople with a more definitive model of a long-standing political myth
through which to perceive the post-Soviet wodd. This theory's populariry
can be attributed to its timing rather than its argument. As mentioned
eadier, many Americans were having difficulry interpreting the new postSoviet wodd. Initially, the essay and the book were denounced, as noted
by Bottici and Challand: "Immediately after publication, his ideas were
strongly criticized, if not simply dismissed as scientifically inadequate to
render the complexities of the wodd we live it" (p. 2). Despite the many
criticisms, Huntington planted a seed in the minds of American policy
makers and journalists that blossomed on September 11 with the attacks
in New York City and Washington D.C. The mainstream media framed
the assaults almost immediately as afl attack on the West by Islam, a frame
which emulated the view of many policy makers in the George r0fl Bush
administration's view of the crisis.s This project is a systematic analysis
of four mainstream print media s6u16ss-NJew York Times, !7a11 Street
Journal, Time, and USA Today-from Septemb er 1.1,, 2001, to December
31., 2001..

Another piece which influenced *y research is The Myth of the Clash
of Civilizations by Chiara Bottici and Benoit Challand. Their work helped
me pinpoint my thesis, though it diverges somewhat from theirs. They
write,

How was it possible, then, that a theory that had been so strongly
criticized has turned into a lens through which so many people look
at the world?...Our book argues that this is because the Clash of
Civilizations has become a successful political myth. The appeal of
Huntington's book lies in its title more than in its content @ottici &
Challand 2).

In my analysis of Huntington's book I covered his three issues with
Islamic and Confucian civthzattons, his use of explicit-denunciationimplicit-support and his all-around focus on Islamic ctvthzations
iuxtaposed with the !7est. I disagree with the assertion Huntington's title
is more appealing than the contents within the book. To claim this reduces
the framing of the Clash of Civilizations in the media, and avoids the
potential influence of the contents of the book. Granted, Bottici and
Challand use the vague phrase "so mafly people," but one can infer from
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the content
the med.ia.

of their book they

are mainly referring to policy makers and

I will argue it is not this simple. Claiming the title carries more weight
than the contents of the theory creates rwo problems: it overlooks the
contents of the theory in comparison to political rhetoric and media
coverage and it denounces the abiJity of the contents of a political theory
to influence media and policy. I will argue the Clash of Civilizations
theory was used in two frameworks by poJicy makers and the media in
light of September 11: A large scale, geopolitical frumework and a micropolitical framework. The geopolitical ftamework refers to the concept that
Bottici and Challand argue for. It is adopting the idea of clashing, isolated
ctvitzattons-2nd as I cover in my media analysis, the juxtaposition of
the ITest and Islam. The micro-political framework is the use of specific
arguments from the book, such as "promoting lfestern political values
and institutions by pressing other societies to respect human rights as
conceived in the S7est" (Huntington, i.996, p.1,85). I will be using the
cascading activation model created by Robert Entman as a justification for
the geopolitical and micro-political frameworks (Entman,2004, p. 10, see
image 1). This model explains how both frameworks are used within the
media.

According to the model, the reciprocal relationship between
the 'Administration" and "Other E]ites" explains how the Clash of
Civitzattons theory was adopted. First, Samuel Huntington created the
theory tn 1996, explaining the longstandrg idea that civilizations had
been in conflict with each other for many years. Though it was denounced
and almost forgotten, the Septemb er 1.1, 2112g[s-accompanied by the
unrest in the Middle East, particulady the first Intifada between Israel
and Palesdns-snabled it to resurface, stronger than ever. Subsequent to
September 11, the Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of the tWodd
Order became an instant bestseller: so much so that by 2002, Netscape,
an internet provider, was offering free copies (Abrahamian, 2003, p.
529). Ervand Abrahamian, in discussing the proliferation of thc Clash of
Civi-lizations theory writes, "Paradigms do not have to be true to become
conventional wisdom" (2003,,p. 529). Simply by logically assessing the
resurgence and exponential increase in sales of Huntington's book one
can come to the conclusion that in moving from a theory which was
mostly part of academia in the 1990s to becoming conventional wisdom
within the public after Septemb er 1.1. some kind of arbiter is needed to
bridge the gap. That bridge is the American media. The idea of the media
serving as an intermedt^ry to the public is supported in the cascading
activation model as well (see Image 1. for avtsual representation of the
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model). Before the information is relayed from the media to the public
it goes through a framtngprocess-the framing is also closely related
to the "Other Elite" category, which would include Huntington as an
"expert." Also, because I will be adhering to the cascadirg activation
model in my research of the media, if I do uncover rhetodc and
reporting that resembles either framework I mentioned above, it gives
all the more evidence the Clash of Civilizatfon theory was used in the
reporting of Muslims and Islam. As I have previously stated, ffiy assertion
is the pofiray^I of Muslims and Islam through the lens of the Clash of
Civitzattons was done so, pardy, in suppoll-21d to garner support-of
aggressive action in Afghanistan and Iraq.
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I examined the Tuesday paper each week in all fout of my sources.
I chose the Tuesday of every week because it was the day the attacks
happened, and many of the mainstream papers ran articles specifically on
the anniversaries of the attacks in subsequent weeks. It systemattzed my
research because my media analysis was, in some respects, a comparative
study, the matedal between sources was easier to compare.
I was able to find many different books that provided a similar
analysis as mine. Due to this, I benefitted from in-depth coverage and
interpretation of some articles that were not available because of my datespecific analysis. My short summer research program was a Iiability when
it came to my researchi given more time I would have examined more
sources. In my media analysis, I looked for explicit statements and implicit
allusions to the Clash of Civiliz^t1ons. Among the explicit statements I
'West;
searched for are: a clash between Islam [Muslim world] and the
Islam vs. the'West; descriptions of the Middle East as backward, archarc,
pre-modern, barbaric; Manichean dualism. In other words, good vs. evil;
and descriptions of the West, particulady the US, as the pinnacle of
civiliz ation-which demonstrates the dialectical relationship between the

West and Islam. The implicit allusions were more difficult to find as they
needed to be discovered contextually tather than superficially. An example
of this is the coverage of the oppressed Afghan woman under the rule
of the Taliban. Another example is the concept of knowing the enemy
hates the west because of their values, which ,[rd.r to Claih as it implies
the west's values to be right. After the data was collected I organtzed the
evidence using a mixture of chronological and thematic order. Initially,
the first few weeks of reporting were placed chronologically, but once
I noticed a shift of focus in reporting I switched to a more thematic
assessment. The aim of my fesearch is to act as an extension to studies
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of media representation of Islam and Muslims, the Clash of Civilizations
theory, and the media's relationship to foreign policy.
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One feels that, through the spread of technology, the ability to acquire
information in New York from Iran brings the two cultures and wodds
togethef. It does, but only to a certain extent. One of the main factors that
inhibit this connection is the manner in which the media operates. For
most, the media is the main source of informational access to the rest of
the world. It has the ability to create a country's interpretations of events,
peoples, cultures, religions, and nations abroad. A news org flrzation can
create an entire viewpoint from a single article simply by writing of an
event, if readers have no other access than that particular news source.
In the concept of a free press the power of the media could act as a
check on the government. Robett Entman elaborates: "Ideally, a free
press balances official view with a more impartial perspective that allows
the public to deliberate independently on the governmentt decisions"
@,ntman,2004, p. 2). The large-scale point of my research is to add to the
concept the press is not free from influences and is instead molded and
shaped by the political arena-particularly policy makers and government
officials. Proving the mainstream media adopted, in varying degrees, a
Clash of Civilizattons framework in its coverage of Muslims and Islam
means individuals should understand where information comes from
before internalizingthe information as fact. Thrs project is founded on
the principle of power-knowledge.6 Conventional criticism of the media
is the partisan framing, particulady done on news 5121isns-the most
criticized are Fox News and MSNBC. Often overlooked is the concept
of a larger framework: the media functioning complementarily or as a
cohesive unit. The concept of partis an framrng is an obvious bias in
reporting but also limits the discussion.T The New York Times is arguably
the most influentialpaper in the wodd, and more importandy for this
study, in the United States.s The paper's bias is collectively more liberal,
which gives rise to my reasoning for selecting the \Wal1 StreetJournal. This
paper is more conservative, and among the most rcad papers in the US,
so an analysis of the \7SJ and the NYT side-by-side gives both sides of
the partisan story. It also means finding evidence in both papers proves
the framing is non-partisan. I chose Time due to the magazine's different
approach to reporting using pictures alongside text, as well as less technical
language in reporting political events. In addition, Time essentially sits in
the middle of the partisan spectrum and was a top magazrne with political
coverage from 2001,-2003.e USA Today is considered soft news, meaning
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the reporting uses terminology and rhetoric more appealing to laypeople.
Although it is not the neu/spaper upon which I will be focusirg *y
analysis, USA Today u/as the top newspaper in circulation during the time
my research covers.io
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on
like manyother print med.ia sources, r^fl
^special
^ugurine,
Septemb er 1L Many of its central themes were akin to the New York
Times and the \Wall StreetJournal's coverage of the eveflts: a strong focus
on nationalism and rallying around the flag, the immense sorrow felt by all
Americans for those who lost their lives, and the lingering question "what
is next?" However, one article stands out to be quite unlike the rest of the
issue. The kicker of the special edition is an article called "The Case for
Rage and Retribution" by Lance Morrow. As mentioned in the essay's title,
Morrow attempts to make a logical argument for rage among the American
people. The target is never specifically mentioned, although many of his
statements are descriptive enough for one to formulate who the enemy is.
He writes,

Time

\il7hat's needed is a unified, unifying, Pead Harbor sort

of purple

American fury-a tuthless indignation that doesn't leak away tn a week
or two...into a corruptly thoughtful relativism (as has happened in the
recent past, when, for example, you might hear someone say, 'Terrible
what he did, of course, but, you know, the Unabomber does have a
point, doesn't he, about modern technology? (Azlortow, 2001)
tWhat

Morrow argues in this is not for Americans to logically assess the
a non-identifiable enemy. Applyr"g this logic
attacks but to direct rage
^t
to the rest of the article creates an understanding of who the true enemy
is. Morrow goes on to write, "LetAmerica explore the rich reciprocal
possibilitiestf thefatwa. A policy of focused brrrtality does not come
easily to a self-conscious, self-indulgent, contradictoqr, diverse, humane
nation with a short attention span." The wrongful use of the term fatwall
in the aforementioned sentence misrepresents Islam and Muslims as brutal
and incorporates the geopolitical effect

of the Clash of Civilizations

theory. It differentiates Islam and the S7est, arguing the !7est should take
up the barbaric qualities of the Islamic world. But Morrow does not stop
here. He continues, "Anyone who does not loathe the people who did
these things, and the people who cheer them on, is too philosophical for
decent company." The use of people here calls to mind an ethnic group or
civilization of people cheering on crazed terrorists.l2
Morrow concludes his article with this statement: "The worst times, as
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we see, separate the civilized of the wodd from the uncivilized. This is the
moment of cladty. Let the civilized toughen up, and let the uncivilized take
their chances in the game they started." One should keep in mind, this is
the last statement in a special edition of Time magazine read by Americans
on one of the most impressionable days of their lives. Morrow blatandy
incorporates the Clash of Civilizations theory in this passage, although
he uses different terminology. The civilized are the West; the uncivilized,
Islam. One should note uncivilized does not refer to those on the fringe
of the Islamic civilization, but rather everyone who lives in the Islamic
world. Due to the importance of this issue of Time and the positioning of
this essay, it invokes a priming effectl3 for its audience who associate the
attacks with the dichotomy of the civilized $7est and the uncivi.lized Islam.
The New Yotk Times, WalI Street Journal, and USA Today did not initially
use the same coverage as Time magazine; their initial reporting was slightly
less explicit in it Clash of Civilizations framing.
The New York Times' coverage of Muslims and Islam after the
terrorist attacks varied in each story. On September 12 the Times rarr an
article about the anti-Arab and Muslim attacks all across the country.'o
The article displayed some sympathy towards Muslims, referencing the
profiling and internal aggression against Muslims after the Oklahoma Ciry
bombing. In the same article, references are made about the controversial
televised images of celebrating Palestinians. David A. Hatds of the
AmericanJewish Commission is quoted as srying, "The factthat they are
celebrating means they become our enemy." This statement essentially
puts into words what many Americans felt when they saw the videos
on television. The article, however, fails to provide any counter-point
to Mr. Harris' statement; instead, the author just moves on letting the
volatile assertion resonate with the reader. Within the same issue of the
New York Times is an article titled 'Attackers Believed to Be Sane."ls
This is the first instance of the dialectical relationship between the \West
and Islam that is mentioned by the Times. The title implies these men
cannot be labele d as crazed, barbaric religious fanatics, like the many
other terrorists. The author goes on to describe some interviews with a
few psychologists who have studied the psychologl, of terrorism. One
quote in particular is interesting because it works against the concept
of the Clash of Civilizztrorrs, especially when Islam is used as the rootcause to terrorism. The article quotes Dr. Harvey I{ushne\ a terorism
expert from Long Island Universiry, who said, "The person who does this
[commits suicide in a bombing attack] does not see himself as giving up
his life at a premature point. He sees it as for the greater good of society.
And for us who try to guard against thts, iC,s disastrous." Unlike some of
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the subsequent articles on terrorists out of the Middle East, this article
includes a concept that cal1s into question conventional wisdom about
terrorist motives. This is saying those who attacked the United States did
so, in their eyes, for the greater good of sociery, rather than due to Islam.
This counter-point is short-lived, as the very next point made by Dr.
Vamik Volkan, an expert on inter-ethnic conflict out of the University of
Virginia Medical School: "Indeed, after their deaths, suicide bombers are
often celebrated as heroes by their families and their communities."l6 This
claim works to support the juxtaposition between the two civilizations
because it presents an image of the barbaric Other taking pleasure in

killing people.
In the same New York Times issue, in the article 'America the
Vulnerable Meets a Ruthless Enemy,"17 the author uses the same kind of
rhetoric as a writer for the S7al1 StreetJournal does two days later. Burns
-"vrites, "On the tape, Mr. Bin Laden read a chilling poem with themes that
have a powerful resonance among Muslims with the grievances against
America." \With very similar tone, the subsequent article in the Wall
^
Street Journal tided "Moving Target: Bin Laden's Network, Far-Flung
andFanatic, Challenges Retaliation" reads, 'Above all, [a1 Qaeda's] 'great
strength is his [Bin Laden] ability to pick up people, especially Muslims in
Western countries at a loose end, looking for a cause,'Mr. Randal says."
Both of these articles employ the Orientalist concept of knowing the
Orient, which is in this case is the practicing Muslim. The universalist
language used in both articles-the former refers to all Muslims, while the
latter refers to those only in lTestern countlis5-5ubjugates the Muslim
into a more primitive, single-minded being.18 The root cause of Muslims
joining al Qaeda, according to both of these articles, is the feeling of
disenfranchisement and animosiry towards the United States.le \What is
constructed in both of these articles is the concept of the bad Muslim.
In the New York Times article the phrase "grievance against America"
is vague, putting a Muslim who criticizes any aspect of the United States
into the bad group. The \Wall StreetJournal article takes it a step further
claiming al Qaeda is able to garner recruits from any Muslim who is
looking for a cause. This concept lumps all Muslims who are looking to
become politically active in with potential terrorists. In addition to the
sweeping genenhzations both of these articles commit, they also create a
good Muslim to serve as the antithesis to the bad. The good Muslim is one
who is not looking for a cause and lacks any grievance toward the United
States because he or she supports the country. Mahmood Mamdani also
covers the idea of the good and bad Muslim using President Bush's speech
as an example of the normalizing of the dichotomy within the post-g/1,1
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United States:
The president seemed to assure Americans that'good Muslims'were
anxious to clear their riames and consciences of this horrible crime
and would undoubtedly support 'us' in awar against 'them.' But this
could not hide the central message of such discourse: unless proved to
be 'good,' every Muslim was presumed to be 'bad.'All Muslims u/ere
rrow under obligatior] to prove their credentials by joining in a war
against'bad' Muslims.2o
Subsequent articles in the New York Times also used this kind

of

distinction as well as incorporatinp; the Orientalist tactic of knowing
In Thomas Friedman's article, "Smokirg or Non-Smoking," he writes,
These [Muslim terrorists] think strategically. They also want to trigger
the sort of massive U.S. retaliation that makes no distinction between
them and other Muslims. That would be their ultimate victorybecause they do see the wodd as a clash of civilizations, and they warrt
every Muslim to see it that way as well and to join their jihad.

He describes the attackers as "Muslim terrorists" yrt denounces
the idea of a C1ash of Civrhzauons. Of all of my research this is the
only instance which I found the phrase Muslim terrorist used, Muslim a
defining characteristic according to Friedman. The phrase is peculiar in
the context of this article because Friedmanblatandy says "they...see the
world as a Clash of Civitzattons." Howevet, the term Muslim as a defining
term for terrorist creates an opposition. Thus, Christian or \Testern of
Jewish must be terminology for those who oppose the Muslim terrorist.
F-riedman adop ts the concep t o f explicit- de nunciation-implicit- supp ort
with his description. Anothet instance of the concept of knowing the bad
Muslim that adheres to the Clash of Civilizations theory comes from an
unlikely source, I(ng Abdullah of Jordan.
Some days later Friedmarr reported on an interview he had with I{ing
Abdullah. Following suit of his previous article he included a quote from
the I(ing of Jordan denouncing the terrorists in same way F.riedman had.

Abdullah said,

They want to break down what America stands for. The terrorists
actually want to provoke attacks on Arabs or Muslims in the U.S.,
because if the American communities start going after each other,
if we see Amertca fragment, then you destroy that special thing that
America stands for.
Once agatn the concept of knowing the Orient is used, but this time it is
zw4
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by the Qdsns-u/hich in turn also gives it credibility." The claim22 that the
Clash of Civilizations is what the terrorists want to create inside the United
States works in a way that implicitly supports the geopolitical aspect of the
theory. If the United States wanted to defend against the terrorists, who
were attempting to cre te a battle between those who would be considered
a part of the Islamic wodd and the 'West, the terrorists would be deemed
as Islam and the U.S. as the \fest.It paradoxically becomes the \West vs.
Islam in defense of the \West vs. Islam.
On September 1.3, an article was run in USA Today that featured
the opinions of m^rry different demographics across the United States;
"Muslims Share USAs Sorrows in Attacks" was one of the headlines. It
starts: "On behalf of the estimated 7 million American Muslims in this
country, I want to condemn the vicious and cowardly acts that transpired
Tuesday in our nation's capital. and in NewYork Ciry." The author of this
piece places the fault of the attacks on Muslims, just not those who are
American. In other words, the assertion supports the Clash of Civilizations
so long as those who are persecuted are not American. Additionally, it fits
the good Muslim, bad Muslim paradigm; requiring those who are good
Muslims to condemn the attacks in the same manner as the author of this
article drd. In another article within the same issue of USA Today, similar
vague language was used.
\Within the same newspaper in the article tided "Bin Laden Hard to
Find," the terrorists in a1 Qaeda are referred to as "Militant Muslims." Just
as Friedman does in "Smoking or Non-Smoking," this article uses Muslim

of the terrorist. This insinuates Muslims,
and Islam as a whole, being the root cause of the attacks. This supports
as the defining characteristic

Huntington's Clash of Civiltzauons theory, both micro-politically and
geopolitically. On the micro-political level, the defining characteristic of
Muslim adheres to Huntington's fourth clause of his book: "The'West's
universalist pretensions increasingly bring it into conflict with other
ctviltzattons, most seriously with Islam and China" (Huntington, 1996, p.
20). The conflict stems from Islam because being Muslim is the defining
charactertstic of the terrorists. In "Taliban May be the First Target of US
Retaliation," Jim Philips, a terrorist analyst of the Heritage Foundation,
is quoted regarding Bin Laden's motives. He says, "Bin Laden hates the
United States because of our values...His terrorism is not meant to affect
our polices as much as shake up our confidence... and help pave the way
for the rz.dicaltzation of the entire Muslim world." Again, the paradoxical
notion of fighting Islam to prevent alarger Clash of Civilizations is
implied. Claiming Bin Laden "hates our values" posits Islam against the
West in the same fashion Huntington argued; implicitly advocating for
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promoting lTestern values. The thesis-antithesis relationship of him
"ftating] ouf values" proves "our values" are good. If Bin Laden wants to
radtcaltze the Muslim wodd the west must pfevent him, for they are a force
of good. As a result, Bin Laden "[hating] our values" invites intervention.
USA Today, in some of its initial coverage, also included some articles
making small attempts to steer its readers away from stereotyping. One of
the most common points brought up was the attacks and discrimination
against Muslims and Arabs after the Oklahoma City bombing. Additionally,
the paper allowed some Muslims to speak for themselves rather than
allowing journalists to assess the conflict and backlash on their own merit.
However, as demonstrated above in "Muslims Share USlt's Sorrows in
Attacks," the Muslims printed in the paper were always good: condemning
the attacks and those who cheered them on, showingalarge amount of
nationalism, and supporting the United States' subsequent military action
in responsc. As the weeks progressed, a new paradigm emerged in the
coverage of Muslims and Islam: The backward, barbaric Middle East.
The structure of the New York Times' article, "\7ho Flates the U.S.?
Who Loves It?" is 2 direct allusion to the Clash of Civilizattons theory.
It starts, "There arcbarbarians out there who hate Amsyig2."-the term
"barbartans" referring to alack of modernity. The article continues with
a quote from President Bush, "Their leaders are self-appointed. They
hate our freedoms, our freedom of religion, our freedom of speech,
our freedom to votes and assemble and disagree with each other." The
president promotes a self-sealing falTacy, as there is no possible way to
prove why they h21s us-because he is speaking for them. All that is
accomplished from this quote is the reinforcement of the juxtaposition
of us and them, and a denouncing of them as a cohesive unit incapable
of thinkrng individually. It is wartime rhetoric, not cultural theory. The
editorial continues down the same road, peppering phrases like "yearnings
for freedom," "there is very little democracy in the Arabic-speaking
and Muslims lands," throughout the article and throwing the term
"l7estoxication" from 1960 Iran into the mix. I found this article to be
very important in the context of the NYT's coverage of the attacks and
Islam due to its argumentative style. Midway through the text the author
addresses potential counter-argumeflts as to why they hate us. One of
the counter-arguments is: "No, fthe Saudi consultative body] replied; the
real motivations for the Sept. L 1 attack were Israel and sanctions against
haq." The author wastes no time in shutting down this argument with
a quote from an unnamed American official: "It was clear they were
trying to deflect the issue. It was a classic case of looking for the outside
problem." This is the first instance in *,*: a counter-argument to the
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Clash of Civilizations paradigm used by the majnstream print media is
presented. Due to the transgressive nature of this assertion, because it
deviates from the conventional paradigm, it is immediately dismissed by
the author. Quickly, the author shifts the focus of the article and begins to
discuss harrtan and Ametlcan economic relations. Islam vs. the S7est is the
overarching theme of the last half of the article. From 'l\merican CD's,
videos, and computer programs are pirated and sold on the streets Tehran"
to "Clerics in Qo* have a sophisticated Islamic computer center where
I{oranic teaching and interpretations are on the Internet," the remainder
of the article uses American influence within Iran to allude to competing,
incompatible civilizations. The \Wall StreetJournal also began using a more
critical tone when referring to Muslims and Islam a few weeks after the
attacks, as well as coveriflg more aggression against American Muslims.
An article published on October 2,2001, discussed an issue berween
a welder and his employer (Shirou zu, 2001). The employer is quoted as
calling Islam "the scum of the earth," and saying Islam "breeds terrotism."
In the same issue a "Muslim melting pot" is said to be the culture in
Afghanistan pope 2001). This notion is meant to be viewed in opposition
to the melting pot of the United States. Afghanistan requires a modrfi.er,
Muslim, whereas the west does not. The same article uses a curious quote
by aTahban leader: "The Muslim wodd is focusing on Afghanistan for
spiritual strength and the love of independence." This emulates some of
the rhetoric of the later coverage of the Afghanistan and Inqwars, but
within the American press. This is only used in passing but it raises a point
about u/ar-time rhetoric and the question of why the Wall StreetJournal
would include a quote that could undermine the war effort because of the
rhetoric's similariry to the Bush Administtation. Among all of the articles
analyzed. this is one of the only instances of the journalist allowing the
terrorist to speak for him or herself.
A large shift in the representation of Muslims and Islam in the
mainstream media took place around the same time as the aforementioned
article. Chris Vecsey, whose book, Following9 /11, analyzes the reJigious
coverage in the New York Times, provides a very helpful description about
this change:

By the second week of October the Times made for a more bellicose
trope regarding Islam, employing'clash of civilizations' rhetoric
through columnists, pundits, and reporters. It engaged in the ambiguiry
of defining American religion, with its Muslims more or less included,
while contrastiflg the faith, the values, the sacralized institutions of the
American way of life to those of an enemy identified with the Islamic
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religion. (201,1, p.9B)
Two important political events coincided with this shift in coverage:
the bombing of Afghanistan began and the frst video of Bin Laden was
broadcast on national television. In the Time magazine special in October
seven countries in the Middle East were summarized tn brief excerpts. In
the summaries there are three statistics: the population, the percent of the
countty that is Muslim, and the per capita GDP. The implication with the
percentage of Muslims is that Islam is one of the most important factors
in a country's demographics, also cleady giving rise to a tie between Islam
and conflict. Later on in the same magazine, "The Taliban Troubles," a
report done regarding the Taliban's rule of Afghanistan, employs more
blatant Clash of Civilizations rhetoric, using the geopolitical framework.
It starts "In a bleak fortified compound few non-Muslims have ever
seen s^t z man few non-Muslims have ever met mulling over the future
of a wanted man" (Mcgeary,2001). Once again, a dichotomy is drawn
between who is and who is not a Muslim. About midway through the
text the geopolitical framework becomes more apparent: "If [Mullah
Mohammad Omar] delivers Bin Laden to the West, he betrays the man
who helped bring him to power and sustains his rule now" (2001). Just as
Huntington used the \7est to disguise his actual reference to the United
States, so too does this author. It is as though Bin Laden had his hand in
attacking all of the West, instead of solely the United States. As a result,
the author invokes the idea of the larger scale clash.
In the New York Times, many articles which covered Muslims or
Islam did in fact use, as Vecsey argues, a much mofe blatant Clash of
Civilizations rhetoric. For example, in the title of the article "Bin Laden
Images Mesmerize Muslims" 1..2 billion people in the wodd are treated
as a drone-like, singular figure who is ovedy-captivated by Bin Laden's
speech (Sachs, 2001). Within this article is the statement, "Mr. Bin Laden
impressed many Muslims with these simple phrases." The simple-minded
Muslims found Bin Laden's simple phrases captivating, accordirg to this
article. Backwardness and the pre-modern Islamic wodd are two coflcepts
produced by this rhetoric, demonstrattng how unlike the people of the
west are from them.
The same day the tWall StreetJournal rzn a story titled "U.S. Retaliation
Draws Little Muslim Objecuon." lVhat the title explicitly says is there was
backlash expected from Muslims, although there is no specified region
where these Muslims are from. Muslims from anywhere were expected
to be angry over the bombing of Afghanistan, thinking and feeling as
a singular entity. This references the Clash of Civilizations, treating the
""/ /::t
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religion as the most important aspect, as well as the expectation of a clash.
Add.itionally, in this article the author uses the terms "Atab wodd" and
"Muslim wodd" to describe the Middle East, making them synonymous.
The perpetuation of this common misconception in American society
doubtlessly helped fuel the attacks on any who looked Middle Eastern
subsequent to the terrorist attacks of Septemb er 11,. Following this article
comes "Fight Plan," which quotes zngry demonstrators screaming, 'Jihad!
Jihad! America is the great Satan." This is the only instance in which I
found a direct quotation of a crowd demonstration. To quote a chant
paints a picture of a huge crowd banded together against a cause, which
in this case is the United States. The issue with this kind of reporting is
its subjectivity. With visuals, although an image can be skewed, it can only
be done to certain extent. If the reader has developed a strong dislike for
Muslims she or he may read this as indisputable proof of the legitimacy of
the Clash of Civilizations. Conversely, someone less biased may interpret it
as a small group of angry people. The first reading is much more probable
for the collective interpretation of this article, due to the priming of the
attacks in the context of Islam.
In the following week, the New York Times ran an article called "Saudi
Royals and Reality" which is essentially a criticism of the Arab media for
its lack of coverage and that fifteen of the nineteen hijackers were Saudis.
What is left out of this argument is the U.S. media essentially did the same
thing, if not worse. As has been mentioned above i, *y analysis, most of
the blame was placed on the Middle East and Islam itself for the attacks.
So, for the New York Times to come out and claim the Arab media
was lacking coverage and criticism adopts the explicit-denunciationimpJicit-support paradigm. It denounced the Arab media-particularly Al
Jazeera-though it implicitly supported the concept of avoiding the Saudi
origin of the hijackers, most likely due to political reasons.
In the midst of my research I inadvertendy came upon the
International section of the New York Times which comes out
of Brussels, Belgium. An Op-Ed was run the same day as the
abovementioned article "The Real Meaning of Jihad." The author
criticized the mainstream media for its reductionist representations of the
term jihad, without any background or history on the term. The author
expounds upon the two rypes of jihad: al-jihad al-akbar (the greater jihad)
and al-jihad al-asghar (the lesser jihad). The greater is considered to be an
internal struggle, whereas the lesser is more in reference to self-defense,
preservation, and justice (R.ourke,2012, p. 15).All of the mainstream
media sources I analyzed used jihad synonymously with "Holy w^r."
On November 1l,Z}}l,Laura Bush broadcast nationally over the
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radio a commemoratiori of the recent attack on Afghanistan from the
concept of ]iberating the Afghan woman. In one instance she says, "Only
the terrorists and the Taliban threaten to pull out women's fingernails for
wearing nail polish. The plight of women and children in Afghanistan
is a matter of deliberate human cruelry, carried out by those who seek
to intimidate and contfol."23 In its entirety, Laura Bush's speech was a
pseudo-feminist appeal to garner more support for the war in Afghanistan.
And abiding by the cascading activation model in nearly an ideal fashion,
the media immediately followed suit in its coverage of the oppressed
Afghan woman under the rule of the Taliban.
Time adhered strictly to the contents of Laua Bush's speech in its
coverage of the Afghan woman after her speech. In the December, 3,
2001, issue the concept was a headliner tided, "Lifting the Veil." In the
leading article, 'About Face," Afghanistan is labeled as being "tribal and
conservalivs"-11ibal used as a term of denunciation rather than as
descriptive. The article's focus lies on the Taliban and its policies, it does
not mention any of the Afghan tribes preserit at this time. In the article's
coverage of different u/omen in Afghanistan, those who show they are
cofltent with some, or all, of their standards are denounced in a deliberate
maflner. The author writes, "Many rural'u/omen, especially, claim to wear
[the burka] willingly, at least when they speak in the presence of their
husbands." The context here insinuates the possibility of these'women
not waflting to wear the burka, but due to the power exercised on them
they cannot say so in front of men. The article continues, "But nearly any
educated woman you may speak to loathes the burka." This entire claim is
an anecdote, as well as the application of cognitive dissonance; meaning
if in private she says she dislikes wearing a burka, one could claim she is
uneducated because she does not know she is oppressed. The article still
continues to push the topic of the oppressed Afghan woman: "So do
many less educated ones-if you question them where men cannot hear."
Another anecdote is used, without any support from quotations.
The New York Times did not take as hardline of an approach to the
concept of liberating the Afghan woman. The November 20 edition,
titled "\)Uomen in Afghanistan, and Here," argued for the positive
portrayal of all Muslims in Afghanistan, as the author felt there was a lack
of it in the NYT. The previous day the NYT ran "Behind the Burka"
which documented some of the stories of the liberated Afghan woman
(lWaldman, 2001). It reads, "The freedom is stil1 too new to completely
trust...but for the first time in years, women here say they have hopethat they will be treated like human beings, not wayward catie." tris
article is able to demonstrate how g""1 t":. Afghan women feel being
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"liberated" by the United States, and argues for more intervention. This,
of all the matenal,I found in my research, is the closest to the Clash of
Civilizations theory. It embodies the micro-political framework of the
second clause Huntington argued for in the Western defense against
Islam and China "to promote $Testern political values and institutions by
pressing other societies to respect human rights as conceived in the \West
and adopt democracy on STestern lines" (Huntington, 1 996, p.1.85-6).
The west is pressing Afghanistan to respect their women as they do. The
article gives reason to push further until all. arc saved by the \West. The
geopolitical framework functions implicitly with this concept of liberation.
As the \7est impresses its own values on that of an Islamic society a
dichotomy is created: the STest and Islam appe^r to be incompatible.
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The media's adoption of the Clash of Civilizations theory in its
framing of Muslims and Islam had three overarchirg implications: social,
intellectual, and political. The former rwo implications are mentioned in
the essay "The US Medra, Fluntington, and September 11" by Ervand
Abrahamian. These assertions I agree with, for they serve to encompass
some of the most important aspects of the impJications of aboveanalyzed media framework. However, Abrahamian misses a third equally
important implication of the Clash of Civilizations framing: the political
ramifcations.
The social implications affected how Muslims and those that looked
Muslim were perceived in the American public. As Abrahamian puts
it, "By framing the crisis in the context of Islam it made all Muslims
suspect-unless they could pfove themselves innocent of being terrorists
or sympathizing with terrorists" (2003, p. 538). SThat emerged from this
was a mass amount of Islamophobia in the United States which led to
angry, discriminz;tory rhetoric, legal discrimination, and even attacks on
American Muslims. "The Reverend Jerry Falwell, the televangelist who
claimed to speak for seventy million Christian fundamentalists, argued that
he had studied enough to know that Muhammad, in contrast to the lawabiding Moses, was a 'terrorist'who 'indulged in violence and warfare,"
writes Abrahamian. This same kind of verbal assault was used by other
Christian fundamentalists in the United States as well: Reverend Jerry
Vines, Chuck Colson, Marvin Olasky, and Reverend Pat Robertson, to
name a few. Legal discrimination was another social implication in result
of the media's framing of the conflict in context of Islam. For example,
a New York Times article titled "F^r From Attacks, a City Finds Peace
Shattered" reads,
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Last week, a cardiologist of East Indian descent from nearby
Huntington was trying to go home on a bus after the airports closes,
stranding him in \)Tashington. $7hen the bus first arrived in Chadeston,
he found himself surrounded by police officers who ordered him to
the ground at gunpoint. They were responding to a panicky report
from his fellow passengers about the man of apparendy of 'Middle
Easter descent' carrying a black bag and asking about alocal airport.
(Toner, 2001)

Many other incidents were reported by the New York Times, \Wa1l Street
Journal, Time magazine, and USA Today. Time magazine even included a
poll of Americans that showed 670/o of Americans supported an ongoing
policy of interviewing about 5,000 people, ages 18-33 within the ArabAmerican and Islamic community [sic]-the poll combines both of these
communities (Just a Few Questions, 2001). In the following week's edition
of Time an afitcle titled, "The Taliban Next Door" was run. The article
7s a narrative of John \)7alker, an American who converted to Islam,
and subsequently joined the Taliban. Written in chronologically, "The
'Walker's
Taliban Next Door" focuses specifcally on John
reading of The
Autobiography of Malcolm X as a turning point, as it u/as apparently the
reason lTalker converted. The article sets up a dichotomy between western
and eastern experiences: "On Friday nights, though, he would change out
of his STestern clothes and attend services at the Islamic Center...John
Walker had transformed himself from a quiet, smooth-cheeked American
teenager to a devout, bearded Muslim studying in Yemen." Its title and
overarching theme is an alarmist one. It implies anyone can convert to
Islam and then become a terrorist. As Abrahamian also notes, over 1,,200
Muslim immigrants were detained without habeas corpus. The culture
of fear within the American Muslim community also increased greatly
following Septemb er 1.1.24
The intellectual implications u/ere a multi-layered problem that, in
some respects, was worse than the social. Abrahamian writes, "Specialists
who did not describe the conflict in the context of Islam and instead asked
awkward questions were sidelined, Ieaving the field wide open to so-called
experts on 'terrorism', 'religislls extremism', and'Islamic fundamentalism."
An example of this is in the review of the book Holy \)Var, Inc. in the New
York Times article "21.st CenturyJihad." In this review, the author gives a
brief overview of the main thesis of the book, followed by cdticism. Holy
S7ar, Inc. is essentially a report on the founding of the Taliban and Osama
Bin Laden. "Bergen [author of Holy $Var, Inc.] has a fine eye for detail,"
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the journalist writes,

him over pot-hole filled paths, across chaotic
boarders, checking out arms bazaars and listening to Bin Laden's soft
cough as he proclaims Americans are fa:r game for attack, we sense
u/e are on an interesting journey with a trusrworthy guide... [Bergen]
bursts the myth that the CIA created Bin Laden, pointing out that the
agency never had a direct relationship with him and that he was always
anti-Ameflcan.
as we accompany

The tone of the review changes in the last quarter of the article becoming
more critical of Bergen. The reviewer attacks a point made in the book
that goes against conventional wisdom in the mainstream media. The
criticism begins:

This book contains one significant faiJing, in my view, and that is
Bergen's analysis of why Bin Laden is at war with the United States.
Bergen takes issue with Samuel Huntington's widely cited thesis that
there is clash of civilizations berween the \X/est and Islam. He says Bin
Laden has a clear and specific political agenda-changing American
policy in the Middle East. He opposes the presence of American
troops in Saudi Arabia, the bombing of Iraq, support for Israel and
for regimes, like those in Egypt and Saudi Arabia, that he considers
apostates from Islam. Bin Laden has never, Bergen notes, railed against
Coca-Cola or Madonna or homosexuals.
The reviewer retorts with, "But this seems a cramped, literal parsing
of Bin Laden's few public statements and, in the end, simplistic and
unsatisfiring. You do not have to accept Huntington's argument entirely to
see that the battle is over more than American foreign policy." Here it is
clear the revie'wer accepts Huntington's entire thesis and views the "war
on terror" as the clash between the civilizations of the'West and Islam.
Not only that, but the concept of Bin Laden's motives being a response
to US foreign policy are denounced as being too simplistic. Though,
paradoxically the writer accepts the theory of the Clash of Civilizations,
which is itself ovedy simplistic. This sort of argumentative sryle was used
to combat the assertions by dissenters that the reasoning for the attacks
was deeper than the superfi,cial concept of the Clash of Civilizations
multiple times.
Additionally, in accordance with Entman's Cascading Activation
Model (see Image 1), two of the most influential academics on
Huntington's thesis served as advisors to the Bush administration-Francis
Fukuyama and Bernard Lewis.2s This close connection demonstrates
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the reciprocal relationship in the Cascading Activation Model between
the "Administration" and "Other Elites," which in turn explains how
the mainstream media was influenced to adopt a Clash of CivfizztTons
framework. Abrahzmran established the social and intellectual implications
of the media's framing of Islam and Muslims in the context of the Clash
of Civiliz^ttons; however, he ovedooks the political.
To frame the September 1,1, attacks and subsequent u/ar on terror solely
in the context of Islam and the Clash of Civilizations completely absolves
the United States of any responsibiJity. The clash acts as a self-fulfilling
prophecy. The United States was not attacked for a r^ttonal political
reason: it was because they hated the values and pluralistic sociery of the
United States. The political implication explains why there was minimal
discussion in the mainstream press of Palestine and Israel's relationship,
the sanctions on Iraq in the 90s, the bombing of Al Shifa in Sudan, the
U.S. support for the mujahedeen, and many other issues American foreign
policy had a hand in. An example of this comes in the abovementioned
quote of the I(ng Abdullah's reasoning for the September L1. attacks. To
reiterate, Abdullah says,

They want to break down what America stands for. The terrorists
actually want to provoke attacks on Arabs or Muslims in the U.S.,
because if the American communities start going after each other,
if we see Amertca fragment, then you destroy that special thing that
America stands for.

This turns the attacks into aggressive, irrational action against the
United States. There is no mention of other potential motives of the
terrorists. Instead, I(ing Abdullah claims to know exactly what the
terrorists-in this case the term terrorist is direcdy associated with
Arab and Muslim-u/ant to do. The absolving the political implication
accompJishment sets the tone for the intellectual implication. By I{ing
Abdullah putting the conflict into the context of Islam, he adds to the
paradigm, making it more conventional. With each example of the
interpreting of the war on terror solely due to Islam the paradigm grows
stronger, and more of a truth in the academic sense. Anyone who attempts
to step outside thatparadig-, and as Abrahamian said "ask awkward
questions," is not only seen as a dissident, but also less of an academic.
This close relationship berween political and intellectual implications of
the mainstream media's framing of the Clash of Civilizations is present in
the New York Times' book review of Holy $Var, Inc.
When the author says, "You do not have to accept Huntington's
argument entirely to see that the batde is over more than Amedcan foreign
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policy," the argument embodies the political implication of the Clash of
Civitzattons framing. Intellectually, Bergen, the author of Holy'War, Inc.
is denounced as not understanding the crisis. But in addrtion, his argument
regarding foreign policy is attacked. Due to this attack, the idea of the
Clash is perpetuated, while other critical arguments are denounced. To
criticize the United States' foreign policy, or even bring it into question
is to invite the same assault as Bergen received. Thus, the political
environment becomes constrained, only allowing viewpoints that stricdy
adhere to the status quo.
In the article "S7odd'War IV," published on November 1.3,2001 in
\Wal1
the
Sueet Journal, this status quo was further solidified. The author,
Eliot A. Cohen, argues for policy makers and the public to focus attention
on a different enemy: "The eflemy in this war is not terforism but mi-litant
Islam." In this example, the conflict is explicitly put into the context of
Islam. If this is true then it does not matter whether the U.S. was involved
within the Middle East. The problem is innate to Islam, aradical side of
it, but Islam nonetheless. Cohen continues his argument with advocating
for "two objectives for the U.S: 1) Smashing Al Qaeda, 2) Teaching a
lesson to governments that shelter such organizations" (2001). The
argumentative style of the article treats the militant Islam as the creator of
the problem with the September 11, attacks and the United States'move
to retaliate as a defense and preventative measure. Once aga;tn one sees a
lack of historical consciousness in Cohent assessing of the conflict, which
consequently allows the Amertcan government freer reign over the war in
the Middle East. \Weeks following "Wodd \War IV," Thomas Friedman of
the New York Times produced a similar article that adhered to the same
Clash of CivilizatTons paradigm while also whitewashing the U.S. of all
responsibiliry.
Friedman begins, 'IMe're not fighting to eradicate 'terrorism.'Terrorism
is just a tool. \We're fighting to defeat an ideology: religious totalitarianism"
(Friedman 2001). This statement is similar to one made two weeks before
by Cohen, and it has the same effect. In two of the most important
ne\Mspapers, which most would argue are on opposite sides of the political
spectrum, two very influential authors-Thomas Ftiedman and Eliot A.
Cohen-said essentially the same thing with only two weeks dividing their
statements. Unlike Cohen, Friedman continues adding to his interpretation
of the war on terror. He writes, "The opposite of religious totalitarianism
is an ideology of pluralism-an ideology that embraces religious diversity
and the idea that my faith can be nurtured without claiming exclusive
truth." Here one sees the juxtaposition between the rwo civilizations.
Islam is seen as home to "religious tota]itarianism," whereas the U.S.
1'nr....
Z
-,/'il

r'\-lr"t
i, i;
Lz
4." "a,;

,
I
2

1l
-.1:
t

houses pluralism. Friedman continues by explicitly stating this concept:
'Amedca is the Mecca of that ideology, and that is what Bin Laden hates
and that is why America had to be destroyed." I(nowing the motives of

Bin Laden embodies the political implication. Even if Bin Laden himself
was to relay a message claiming the attacks on September 11 were a result
of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, or the sanctions on Iraq, or some other
U.S. involvement in the Middle East, those claims would fall outside of
the paradigm of the Clash of Civiliz^t7ons set within the media. After a
paradigm is solidified in the mainstream media, no one person can change
that paradig-.
"Parudtgms do not need to be true to become conventional wisdom,"
as AbrahamTan said (2003). As demonstrated above, they can be
denounced in the intellectual communiry and still reemerge years later.
Because the mainstream American press media adopted the Clash of
Civtltzattons theory in its framing of Muslims and Islam, information
should not be taken as is from this media system. It is almost impossible
to change the structure of the American media due to its size as well
as the decades of ideological reinforcing. It is up to each individual to
discern the media framework at any given time, and apply skepticism and
criticism when necessary. This is easy, but it is necessaty rf one u/ants
to obtain
information. The wodd is becoming more globalized
^ccura;te
and interconnected. I(nowledge and skepticism are the only two u/ays to
prevent this connectedness from fragmenting.
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After this paper was completed, it was pointed out to me that a similar
argument has been developed by Philip Seib in the NTinter 2004 edition of
the journalParameters Vol. 34 Issue 4,p71, titled: The News Media and
L.

the "Clash

of Civilizations"

2. Thrs same type

of linguistic gymnastics

was used after September

11th, first by President Bush in his reiteration that this is not a war with

Islam, follorved by the media adopting the same characteristics of explicitdenunciation implicit-support. For example, the often used "Barbartans at
the gate," and "The one true faith."
3. See Orientalism, pages,222-224 278-289, and 308-309. For example,

"Orientalism staked its existence, not upon its openness, its receptiviry
to the Orient, but rather on its internal, repetitious consistency about its
constitutive will-to-power over the Orient." Also, "the Orientalist could be
regarded as the special agent of \Testern power as it attempted policy visi-vis the Orient."
4. These three issues Huntington claims the !7est should become more
involved in were adopted as some of the main argumentative points in the
mainstream Amertcafl media's framing of the Afghanistan and Iraq wars.
5. For example, Dick Cheney, Paul \Wolfowitz,Bernard Lewis, and Francis
Fukuyama.

This concept is best studied in-depth from the works Discipline
and Punish and The History of Madness both by Michel Foucault.
6.

E,dward Said, however, gives an excellent summary

of power-knowledge

in Orientalism: "I(nowledge gives power, more power requires more
knowledge, and so on in an increasingly profitable dialectic of information
and control."
7. An example of the limiting effects of media on discussion can be found
in two side-by-side articles in Time magazine regarding preemptive war
in Iraq. See articles "Let's Wait to Attack" and "No Let's Not \Waste Any
Time" in the October 14,2002 Time magazine. Between the two articles
the main theme of the arguments are immediately going to war with Iraq
and holding off on war. These two articles serve to frame the argument on
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potential war in Iraq into a mtntmized spectrum.
8

. http : /

/

adage. com f arttcle f datacenter/ news p ap er- circulatio n - 6 -m o s -

ending-9-30-02/1,06705/ The

NYt

WSJ, and USA Today were the top

three papers in circulation in 2001,.
9. http:/ / adage.comf datacenterf datapopup.php?article id= 1,06627
10

. http : /

/

adage. com f aracle f datac enter / n ews p ap er- circulatio n-

6 - mo s -

ending-9-30-0 1 / 10637 8 /
11. From the Concise Encyclopedia

of Islam: 'A fatwa is a formal legal
opinion given by a mufti or canon lawyer of standing, in answer to a
question submitted to him either by a judge or by a private individual. On
the basis of such an 'opiniotr' a judge may decide a case ) or an individual
may regulate his personal life."

Another example of this method of referring to alarge group of
peoples-connected ethnically, religiously, s1s.-is in the oft used phrase
"Why Do They Hate Us?" They in this question have a collective mind.
Sources: The Big Terrible, Smoking or Non-Smoking NYT, WSJ: US steps
up leaflets, Time: How Do They See Us Now?
13. "Priming refers to the effect of some preceding stimulus or event on
how we react, broadly defined, to some subsequent stimulus. As applied
to the media, prirning refers to the effects of the content of the media
on people's later behavior or judgments related to the content that was
processed." In The SAGE Handbook of Media Processes and E,ffects by:
Robin L. Nabi, Mary Beth Oliver, p. 14
1.4.In US, Echoes of Rift of Muslims andJews; interestingly enough the
article covered violence against Arabs as well, yet the title only contained
Muslims, implying Muslims are Arabs.
15. Goode, E.(2001, S.p 12). Attackers believed to be sane, NewYork
12.

Times.
16. Ibid.
17. Burns,J. F. (2001,

S.p L2).'iAmeflca the r,'ulnerable meets a ruthless

enemy." New York Times.

There are many examples of this concept displayed more explicidy
in texts from previous years; for more see: The Roots of Muslim Rage
18.
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by Bernard Lewis; or Maxime Rodinson in Europe and the Mystique

of

Islam (1,987) "The Oriental m^y always have been chancterrzed as a savage
eflemy, but during the Middle Ages, he was at least considered on the same
level as his Europeafl counterplrt...In the nineteenth century, however,

off in his own specificity, yet
worthy of a kind of grudging admiration. This is the origin of the homo
he became something quite separate, sealed

islamicus, a notion widely accepted even today."

A concept the Francis Fukuyam argues for in his article in Slate,
"Europe vs. Radical Islam":http:/ /www.slate.comf attclesf artsf
19.

b

o oks / 200 6 / 02 / europ e-vs-radical_is lam.

html.

20. Good Muslim, Bad Muslim: America, the Cold S7ar, and the Roots

of

Teror by: Mahmood Mamdani, p. 15.
21. Banks' Tlpology: I{ing Abdullah is an Indigenous-Outsider, meaning,
though he has adopted the values of an external community his opinion
about his indigenous community still carries more weight than someone

of the concept of Banks'
Typology see: Applying Banks' Typology of Ethnic Identity Development
external like Friedman. For a full review

and Curriculum Goals to Story Content, Classroom Discussion, and the

Ecology of Classroom and Communiry (1996)
22.This is similar to the point Said makes: "Both the traditional
Orientalist, as we shall see, and I(ssinger conceive of the difference
between cultures, first, as creating a battlefront that separates them, and
second, as inviting the \)7est to control, contain, and otherwise govern

(through superior knowledge and accommodating power) the Other"
(Said, Orientalism, p. 48).
23. http: / /www.presidency.ucsb.edu /ws /?pid=24992
24. tror examples

of this fear see: "Group Struggling to Shed Association

with Terrorism: Narrative about a Muslim woman who'was so scared she
could not go out into public for weeks after the attacks" (September 18,
NYD, 'After Terror: Muslim \Welder F-iles Discriminations Suit, Claims
Firing Reflects Religion, Ethnicity: Story of a Muslim man fired by his
employer, on the grounds of his religion" (Shirortztq 2001); "stocks Fall,
with Notable Losses in Some Muslim Lands: Traders and investors plan to
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'sell everything Muslim after the attacks, due to the negative connotation

with the religion"
25. One example of the influence of these two scholars: they both
served as panelists afld speakers at a conference ritled, "Islam
and the \)7est" on Bernard Lewis' 90th birthday http://www.
businesswire.com / portal / site/google/index. j sp?ndmViewld= newsview&newsld= 200 6050 1 005 5 5 7&newslang= en
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Adelman, K. (2002, October 14). No, Let's Not \Waste Any Time. time,
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Ayoob, M. @ec 29,2001). How to Define a Muslim American
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